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A Hybrid Sticky-Price and
Sticky-Information Model
Abstract
This paper shows that a hybrid of the sticky-price and sticky-information
models of price adjustment is able to deliver a hump-shaped ination re-
sponse to monetary shocks without counterfactually implying, as in Mankiw
and Reis (2002) or Altig et al. (2005), that individual rmsprices change
each quarter (whether they respond or not to the shock). Under the assump-
tion that rmsprice-setting decisions are strategically neutral, the ination
response to a transitory shock to the money-supply growth rate is hump-
shaped for the hybrid model, whereas it is monotonic for both the sticky-
price and sticky-information models. If the shock is permanent, then this
response is hump-shaped for the sticky-information and the hybrid models,
whereas it is at for the sticky-price model.
Keywords: hump-shaped impulse response, ination persistence, Phillips
curve, strategic complementarity. JEL Classication Number: E31.
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1 Introduction
Most macroeconomic models in the economic literature are unable to recon-
cile the two following stylized facts, at least not without abandoning rational
expectations:
 Frequency of individual price changes
The following quotation by Klenow and Willis (2006b) provides a good
summary of the literature on the frequency of price changes: "The
recent micro empirical literature [...] nds that nominal prices typically
change at least once per year. Bils and Klenow (2004) and Klenow and
Kryvtsov (2005) report that U.S. consumer prices change every six
months or so, on average. Dyne et al. (2005), surveying a spate of
recent studies, conclude that Euro Area prices typically change around
once per year. Similarly, Taylor (1999) summarized the earlier evidence
as saying prices change once a year on average."
 Ination dynamics
After a monetary shock, it takes more than one year for prices to com-
pletely adjust. The impact of a monetary shock on ination is not only
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persistent, it is also hump-shaped. Mankiw (2001) argues that there
is a broad consensus that shocks to monetary policy have a delayed
and gradual e¤ect on ination. He refers to the traditional emphasis
on the "long and variable lags" of monetary policy and the refrain of
central bankers that they need to be forward-looking and respond to
inationary pressures even before ination arises. He also indicates
that it shows up in most empirical work. He refers to specic episodes
(Paul Volcker started his historic disinationary policy in the United
States in October 1979, but the big declines in ination came in 1981
and 1982) and to results from standard vector autoregressions.1 The
large VAR literature on the subject also conrms this nding. For
example, Christiano and al. (2005) nd that "ination responds in a
hump-shaped fashion, peaking after about two years."
1He mentions however that there is some debate about when the maximum impact
occurs: Bernanke and Mark Gertler (1995) conrm the conventional wisdom that it occurs
after a long lag, nding that monetary shocks have no e¤ect on the price level at all during
the twelve months after the shock, whereas Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) nd shorter
lags, with monetary shocks having a large impact after two quarters.
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It may seem di¢ cult to reconcile both stylized facts within the same
model: when prices are kept constant less than one year (as the micro-
economic stylized fact requires), it may seem di¢ cult to account for the
macroeconomic stylized fact that the impact of a monetary shock on ina-
tion persists for more than one year. Taylor (1980) shows, however, that
there is endogenous persistence: even if rms change their prices every year,
price adjustment will not be complete after one year if price setting is stag-
gered and if there is strategic complementarity in price setting (that is, rms
tend to avoid large changes of their prices relative to those of competitors).
Chari et al. (2000) respond that staggered price-setting cannot solve the
persistence problem. The feature key to their ndings is that their dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model yields strategic substitutabil-
ity rather than strategic complementarity. Woodford (2003) argues that
the parameterization of Chari et al. (2000) implies a "considerable degree
of strategic substitutability," whereas they would nd substantial strategic
complementarity if they had taken into account the existence of rm-specic
production factors.
Even though assuming a high degree of strategic complementarity may
yield a su¢ cient degree of ination persistence, Mankiw (2001) notes that
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a standard sticky-price model is unable to reproduce the hump-shaped re-
sponse of ination following a monetary shock. This is why Mankiw and Reis
(2002), henceforth MR, have proposed an alternative to the standard sticky-
price model: a sticky-information model.2 The main new feature of their
model is that nominal rigidity is not due to the cost of changing price tags
and menus, but to the cost of acquiring information in order to re-optimize
prices.3 While the standard sticky-price model features a Calvo staggered
price-setting process, motivated by menu costs, in which all rms face the
same constant probability of having the opportunity to change prices, MR
assume that in each period all rms face the same constant probability of be-
ing able to re-optimize current and future prices (henceforth, MR staggered
information-updating process). Between two re-optimizations, a rm follows
its price plan rather than keeping its price constant (since there is no menu
cost, there is no reason to keep prices constant).4
2Another advantage of the sticky-information model is that in this model, unlike in
the standard sticky-price model, anticipated disinationary policies have no expansionary
e¤ects.
3As discussed in Ball et al. (2005), imperfect information is a short-cut to the harder
task of modeling imperfect information-processing.
4In the sticky-information model, rms set their prices at a constant markup over
marginal cost. Thus, they do not need to know aggregate variables but only their own
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Altig et al. (2005) respond to Chari et al. (2000) by taking into ac-
count the existence of rm-specic production factors. This generates enough
strategic complementarity to yield realistic dynamics of ination even though
rms re-optimize prices on average only every 1.5 quarters. They respond to
the argument of Mankiw (2001) by generating the correct ination impulse
response thanks to a deviation from the standard Calvo staggering price-
setting process: they assume that rms that cannot re-optimize index their
prices to past ination rather than keeping them constant.5 Thus, they im-
plicitly assume that the underlying nominal rigidity is not a menu cost but
rather imperfect information on nominal variables or imperfect information-
processing.
The models of Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Altig et al. (2005) both have
their shortcomings. In particular, these two models yield a hump-shaped
marginal costs. This problem might be solved by assuming that rms do not know their
own marginal costs. This is an odd assumption that my hybrid model will inherit through
its sticky-information component.
5See Minford and Peel (2004), Mash (2005) and Collard and Dellas (2006) for a dis-
cussion of the role of this assumption.
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ination response at the cost of assuming that prices change every period6
(they consider a period to be one quarter, as is usually done in this lit-
erature), which does not match the microeconomic stylized fact mentioned
above. Since this shortcoming stems from the assumption that there are no
menu costs, it is natural to try to x this problem by introducing some menu
costs into the model.7 Mash (2005) combines the standard sticky-price model
with a model of the same family as that of Altig et al. (the model of Chris-
tiano et al., 2005, which features indexation but not rm-specic capital).
Calibrating the weight of both models to match the microeconomic evidence,
he nds that the ability of his hybrid model to match the macroeconomic
evidence on ination persistence is severely compromised. But even if it had
matched macroeconomic evidence, the deviation from rational expectations
would still be problematic. Mash (2005) argues that if rms could choose
their degree of indexation optimally, they would choose a value that corre-
6Although there is stickiness, prices change every period except in the special, and in
the long run unrealistic, case of zero ination.
7See also Collard and Dellas (2006) In our view, this [assuming Calvo process without
indexation] is the more realistic scenario as the evidence on price setting suggests that
rms set their prices infrequently and discretely, and in between price jumps, prices remain
constant.
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sponds to their belief about the actual persistence of ination, which would
lower persistence over time, converging to a stable long-run value of zero for
both actual and perceived persistence.
Collard and Dellas (2006) build a rational expectations model compatible
with the two stylized facts mentioned above. They assume a standard Calvo
price-staggering process completed with imperfect information. They assume
that agents learn about the true aggregate state of the economy gradually,
using a Kalman lter based on a set of signals on aggregate variables. They
nd that short-lived misperceptions of the state of the economy limit initial
responses while propagating the shocks over time through the real rigidities.
In this paper I propose another alternative. I build a hybrid model incor-
porating both Calvo staggered price-setting and MR staggered information-
updating, thus combining both underlying sources of nominal rigidity, i.e.
menu costs and information costs.8 Such a hybrid model can deliver the
8There are other papers that combine frictions based on menu costs and information
costs. As in Collard and Dellas (2006), one of these frictions is, however, usually neither
MRs sticky information nor sticky prices. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) assume a
one-period decision lag in a standard sticky-price model. Woodford (2003) extends this
setting to an arbitrary number of lags. Kiley (1996) proposes a hybrid of a sticky-price
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above-mentioned microeconomic stylized fact (and also yields heterogeneity
of ination expectations9). It avoids having the shortcoming of the sticky-
information model, since in the hybrid model prices do not change every
period.10 It also delivers the same average duration between a shock and
a rms rst response to it as in the sticky-price model, without having to
model (with endogenized probability of price adjustments) and an imperfect-information
model, which, however, is di¤erent from the sticky-information model. What is usually
called the hybrid model in the literature is a model such as that of Gali and Gertler
(1999), in which some agents have backward-looking ination expectations and the rest
have rational expectations. Ball (2000) assumes that in forecasting ination, agents use
only an optimal univariate forecasting rule.
9Mankiw and al. (2004) argue that the sticky-information model is capable of explain-
ing many features of the observed evolution of both the central tendency and the dispersion
of ination expectations over the past fty years.
10If the money-supply growth rate is zero, then, even in the sticky-information model
rms do not change their price every quarter. In this case, the hybrid model would not
match the frequency of individual price changes better than the sticky-information model.
The case of zero money-supply growth rate is, however, not empirically relevant, since
the average money-supply growth rate is usually di¤erent from zero. As is often done in
this literature (see for example Woodford, 2003), I will use equations linearized around a
zero-ination steady state to discuss cases in which the average long-run ination is near
zero but not necessarily equal to zero.
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assume that prices are, on average, kept constant as long as in that model.
The reason is that in the hybrid model, to respond to a shock, rms must
not only have an opportunity to change their prices but also need to be in-
formed about the shock. For simplicity and for comparability, I stay as close
as possible to MRs framework, although this has some drawbacks, such as
my model inheriting the partial-equilibrium feature of MRs model.
One challenge for new Keynesian models is to explain data while not
assuming too much friction. Thus, adding two kinds of frictions may seem to
be counterproductive. However, considering two types of frictions does not
necessarily imply a larger overall amount of friction, but may only change
the structure of the frictions involved. Moreover, I argue that the sticky
information friction is not enough. Something else is necessary (except when
ination is zero) to replicate the empirical fact that prices do not change
every period. Adding the Calvo process to MRs model makes it possible to
replicate that fact, without necessarily compromising the ability of the model
to match the macroeconomic evidence on the ination response to monetary
shocks (depending on the type of shock, it may even improve it).
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One could think that a hybrid of the sticky-price and the sticky-information
models would yield an average of the macroeconomic performance of the two
pure models. If one believes as MR do that the sticky-information model
yields better results than the sticky-price model, this would lead to the con-
clusion that the hybrid model may not fare as well as MRs model in the
macroeconomic dimension. I show, however, that the hybrid model is not an
average of the two pure models. In the case of strategic neutrality in price-
setting,11 the impulse response of ination to an unexpected shock to the
level of money supply is the same in the sticky-information model as in the
sticky-price model.12 Moreover, their common ination response is strictly
decreasing rather than hump-shaped. However, I will show for this case that
the hybrid model is able to generate a hump-shaped ination response, while
both pure models deliver the same strictly decreasing ination response.
The intuition is the following. In the sticky-price model, rms set their
prices (when they have an opportunity to do so) equal to a weighted average
11That is, a rms desired price does not depend on the prices set by its competitors.
This is an assumption located between those of Woodford (2003) and Chari et al. (2000).
12MR, as well as Keen (2005), notice that the ability of a sticky-information model to
produce a long delay in the peak ination response depends critically on the degree of
strategic complementarity.
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of future desired prices (a desired price is the price a rm would choose if it
faced no nominal rigidity). In the sticky-information model, when rms get
new information, they set a price plan in which the price at each date is equal
to the expected desired price. In case of strategic neutrality, however, the
desired price does not depend on the aggregate price level but only on the
money supply.13 Now consider an unexpected and once-and-for-all change
in the money-supply level. In this case, all rms set their prices equal to
the new long-term equilibrium level as soon as they have the opportunity
to change their prices knowing that the shock has taken place (from now
on, I refer to this price adjustment as the "rst informed price-adjustment").
They will not need to reset them later on. All rms change their prices by the
same amount, determined by the di¤erence between the new money-supply
level and the old one. Thus ination at a given date is proportional to the
number of rms that have the opportunity to change their prices and have
received the information that the shock has occurred. In both the sticky-
price model and the sticky-information model, this number decreases since it
is a constant fraction of a decreasing set of rms: in the sticky-price model
13MR note that in the case of strategic neutrality the desired price moves only with
the money supply: rms adjust their prices immediately upon learning of the change in
policy; as a result, ination responds quickly (much as it does in the sticky-price model).
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this is the set of the rms that have not yet had the opportunity to change
their prices since the shock, whereas in the sticky-information model it is the
set of rms that are not yet informed. In the hybrid case, rms setting their
rst informed prices today are either rms already informed in the last period
and receiving the opportunity to change prices today, or rms that were not
yet informed in the last period but are receiving information today as well as
the opportunity to change prices. The key point is that the number of rms
already informed in the last period and receiving the opportunity to change
prices today is a hump-shaped function of time. Immediately after the shock,
this set is small because only very few rms are informed. After a su¢ ciently
long time, almost all rms are informed, but they have also almost all had
the opportunity to change their prices, so the set is small again. In between,
this set reaches a maximum.
This example shows that the hybrid model is not simply a weighted aver-
age of the two pure models, but can be superior to both. I am not arguing,
however, that the sticky-information model cannot deliver a hump-shaped in-
ation response. Assuming strategic complementarity, MR have found that
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the sticky-information model delivers a hump-shaped response.14 I nd that
this is true even with strategic neutrality if a permanent shock occurs to the
money-supply growth rate rather than to the money-supply level. In this
case, the ination responses are qualitatively similar in the hybrid and in
the sticky-information models, and both are clearly di¤erent from the sticky-
price model response. Thus, assuming strategic neutrality in price setting,
the hybrid and sticky-information models yield, qualitatively, the same in-
ation impulse response to a permanent shock to the money-supply growth
rate. When this shock is more transitory in nature, then the ination impulse
response of the sticky-information model tends to lose its hump, whereas it
stays hump-shaped in the hybrid model: if the shock to the growth rate is
14The following intuition explains why in the case of strategic complementarity the re-
sponses di¤er in the sticky-price and the sticky-information models. In the sticky-price
model, the ination response is maximal when the shock occurs, since the incentive to
change prices is greatest at this time (later, the economy will be closer to its new equilib-
rium). In the sticky-information model rms do not need to overshoot their price changes
in order to avoid being stuck in the future with prices that are out of line with those of
competitors since they set a price plan rather than a price level (they can plan to increase
their prices later when more rms are informed of the shock). The ination response
increases until a peak is reached, after which it converges toward zero as more and more
rms are informed and most of the adjustment has already taken place.
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completely transitory, then it is equivalent to a shock to the level, and the
hybrid model delivers a hump-shaped ination response whereas the two pure
models deliver the same strictly decreasing response.
In this paper I assume strategic neutrality in price setting for three rea-
sons. First, there is currently some debate about what degree of strategic
complementarity is realistic. As mentioned above, the strategic-neutrality
assumption is compatible with the literature. Second, shutting down the
strategic-complementarity channel makes it possible to show that a hump-
shaped ination response can be generated even in the absence of strategic
complementarity. The strategic-neutrality assumption also makes it easier
to show in which sense the hybrid model is di¤erent from an average of
the two pure models. The third reason is that strategic neutrality is the
only case (except in the extreme cases in which the hybrid model reduces
to one of the two pure models) in which the hybrid model yields an exact
closed-form solution. As a rst pass, it therefore seems reasonable to as-
sume strategic neutrality since it is compatible with the literature, yields
interesting results and is easier to compute. This however has a cost. Ball
and Romer (1990) have shown that nominal frictions alone are not enough
to cause business uctuations generating large welfare losses. This suggests
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that assuming strategic neutrality would imply large menu costs or small
welfare loss. These issues are di¢ cult to discuss in my model since, as in
MR, neither menu and information costs nor the utility function are explicit.
Another issue is that strategic complementarity is likely to be necessary to
get endogenous persistence. Thus, concerning the macro stylized facts, I will
focus on the hump-shaped path of the ination impulse response. I leave for
further research the task of explaining endogenous persistence in a hybrid
model with  smaller than 1.
On the way to computing ination impulse responses, I derive the Phillips
curve for the hybrid model without, at this stage, assuming strategic neu-
trality. One novel feature of this Phillips curve is that it involves a new kind
of expectation operator. Since all rms are not perfectly informed, it is not
surprising that the expectation Et (t+1) of next period ination which enters
the Phillips curve is not the expectation Et (t+1) based on the best knowl-
edge available at time t. However, Et (t+1) is not the average of aggregate
ination expectations but the average of the rmsexpectations about their
own prices increases.
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Dupor et al. (2006) and Klenow and Willis (2006) discuss hybrid models
similar to the one in this paper (they propose, however, general equilibrium
models). Dupor et al. (2006) nd that both sticky prices and sticky infor-
mation play an important role for ination dynamics. Their work is more
empirically oriented than mine, whereas I stay closer to MRs framework
and nd closed-form solutions for the impulse response of ination. Klenow
and Willis (2006) focus on making the link between their hybrid model and
new microeconomic evidence. They nd "modest support" for the sticky-
information model and the hybrid model. Paustian and Pytlarczyky (2006)
also develop a model merging sticky prices and sticky information, but in
their model no rm faces both frictions: some rms face sticky prices, while
others face sticky information. This setup allows them to assess the im-
portance of sticky prices versus sticky information in a nested model that
reduces to either specication in the extreme cases. They nd that the
data favors the sticky-price model over the sticky-information model. Be-
sides these three papers, there are several empirical papers comparing the
sticky-price and the sticky-information models without actually building a
theoretical hybrid model. Their aim is usually to choose the best among the
18
two or more models.15
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the assump-
tions about when rms receive information or an opportunity to change their
prices. Probability distributions resulting from merging the Calvo staggered
price-setting process and the MR staggered information-updating process
are computed (for example, the distribution of the time of the rst informed
price-adjustment after a shock). This time-dependent process must be imbed-
ded in an economic environment in order to yield the magnitude of price
changes (rather than their timing only). Section 3 presents the basic equa-
tions of this environment, staying as close as possible to MRs framework.
Section 4 derives the Phillips curve. Section 5 focuses on the case of strategic
neutrality in price setting and presents the ination impulse response in the
cases of three unanticipated shocks: a transitory shock to the money-supply
growth rate (or equivalently a permanent shock to the money-supply level),
a permanent shock to the money-supply growth rate, and the intermediate
case of a persistent but not permanent shock to the money-supply growth
rate. Section 6 presents concluding remarks.
15For example: Keen (2005), Korenok (2005), Korenok and Svanson (2006), Laforte
(2005) and Trabandt (2006).
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2 The hybrid price-setting and information-
updating process
This section merges Calvo staggered price-setting andMR staggered information-
updating and computes two relevant distributions. The way I merge these
two processes is very simple, perhaps the most obvious way to model a rm
facing both kinds of nominal rigidities (menu costs and imperfect informa-
tion).
The Calvo sticky-price process assumes that each rm is always perfectly
informed but each period it faces a constant probability  of being exoge-
nously given an opportunity to change its price (prices are kept constant
between two such opportunities). One possible implicit story behind this as-
sumption is that rms are hit by random idiosyncratic shocks, and because
of high menu costs, they change their prices only when such a shock hap-
pens (assuming that idiosyncratic shocks are more important to rms than
monetary shocks).
MRs staggered information-updating assumes that each rm can change
its price every period at no cost, but each period it faces a constant proba-
bility  of being given updated information exogenously (between two such
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opportunities, prices follow the old plan based on outdated information16).
One possible implicit story behind this assumption is that rms receive in-
formation randomly17 or that they have to make a report on the economic
situation at random points in time (for reasons not connected to price setting)
and may then use this information for the next time they set prices.
My hybrid process is based upon the assumption that each period a rm
faces a probability  of being given an opportunity to change its price and
a probability  of being given updated information. These two events are
assumed to be independent (this is the case if opportunities to set prices
are determined by random idiosyncratic shocks, news arrives randomly, and
these two random processes are independent).18 As in the sticky-price model,
a rm keeps its price constant between two opportunities to change prices.
16MR assume that, between two re-optimizations, a rm does not know or does not take
account of such information as how much it has sold.
17For example Carroll (2003) assumes that in any given period each individual faces a
constant probability of reading the latest forecast in an article (individuals who do not
encounter an article about ination simply continue to believe the last forecast they read).
18Here I do not consider the case in which price setting and information updating are
state dependent. In this case, the two processes may not be independent. For example, if
rms choose to always update their information when they have an opportunity to change
their prices, then the hybrid model would in fact be the same as the sticky-price model.
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Firms remember past information when they are given the opportunity to
reset prices, and so choose a price based on their last-updated information.
This hybrid model encompasses the two pure models. It yields the sticky-
price model if  = 1, and yields the sticky-information model if  = 1. The
possibility that  be di¤erent from 1 is the only di¤erence between my hybrid
model and MRs sticky-information model since, as discussed in section 3, I
otherwise preserve their economic environment (except for focusing on the
strategic-neutrality case in section 5). Since I have assumed that the two
pure processes are independent, any interaction between these processes will
come only from the fact that a rm can respond to a shock in the hybrid
model only if it is both aware of the shock and has an opportunity to change
its prices after the shock has occurred.
2.1 Probability that a current price was set j periods
ago based on information last updated j+k periods
ago
Let 
j;k be the probability that the price of a rm at time t was set at
t   j (and stayed constant since then) based on information last updated
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at t   j   k. The rm faced a probability  of being able to change its
price at t   j, a probability (1  )j of not being able to change its prices
during the j periods until t. Thus, the probability that at t a rm had its last
opportunity to change its price at t j is  (1  )j. Similarly, the probability
that the information available at t  j was last updated at t  j   k is equal
to  (1  )k: the probability  of updating information at t   j   k times
the probability (1  )k of not being able to update information during the
k periods until t  j. Since both processes are independent, the probability
that the current price of a rm was set j periods ago based on information
last updated j + k periods ago is:

j;k =  (1  )j (1  )k . (2.1)
Because of the law of large numbers, 
j;k is also the proportion of rms
in this situation.
For a time unit of a quarter, MR choose  = 0:25 for the sticky-price
model, and  = 0:25 for the sticky-information model, because in each case
a rm on average makes an adjustment once a year. How should  and  be
chosen in the hybrid model? One possibility is  = 0:25 and  = 0:25. This,
however, implies that the duration between a shock and the rst informed
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price-adjustment is more than one year since overall nominal rigidities have
been increased. Lets compute under which condition on  and  the average
adjustment interval is equal to one year.
2.2 Lag between a shock and the rst informed price-
adjustment
Lets compute the probability t that a rm sets its rst informed price-
adjustment t periods after the shock (the nature of this shock is not im-
portant here, since the price response is not computed in this section). In
some particular settings (to be discussed below), this probability will be of
particular importance since the ination response will be proportional to it.
Lets assume that an unanticipated monetary shock occurs at the beginning
of the period t = 0, with some rms possibly already informed of this shock
at t = 0 before setting their prices (or equivalently, the shock occurs at the
end of period t =  1 when rms have already set their prices for period
t =  1): at time t = 0 (and possibly later on as well) money supply di¤ers
from what all the rms previously expected. A rm that set its rst informed
price adjustment at t may have been rst informed of the shock at t  j (the
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probability that this happens is  (1  )t j), and then had to wait j periods
to receive an opportunity to change its price (the probability that this hap-
pens is  (1  )j). Thus, the probability that a rm sets its rst informed
price adjustment at t while having been rst informed of the shock at t  j is
 (1  )j (1  )t j = 
j;t j. Since j could be anywhere between 0 and t,
the probability t that a given rm sets its rst informed price adjustment
at t is the sum over 0  j  t of 
j;t j:
t =
tX
j=0

j;t j =
tX
j=0
 (1  )j (1  )t j =
8>><>>:
 (1 )
t+1 (1 )t+1
  if  6= 
2 (t+ 1) (1  )t if  = 
:
(2.2)
Except for the pure cases  = 1 or  = 1, the probability t is a hump-
shaped function of t. The maximum occurs at:
tmax =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
ln( ln(1 )ln(1 ))
ln( 1 1 )
  1 if  6=  and  6= 1 6= 
  1
ln(1 )   1 if  = 
0 if  = 1 or  = 1
: (2.3)
The expectation of the distribution t is 1 +
1

  2. Taking into ac-
count that it is possible to have an informed price-adjustment at t = 0, a
rst informed adjustment at t implies a duration before the rst informed
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adjustment of t+ 1. Thus, the average duration is 1

+ 1

  1. In the sticky-
price model,  = 1 and this average duration is 1

(and  = 0:25 yields an
average duration of four quarters). Similarly, this duration is 1

in the sticky-
information model (and  = 0:25 yields an average duration of four quarters).
In the hybrid case, an average duration of four quarters implies the following
condition: 1

+ 1

= 5. Assuming that  = , this yields  = 0:4 = .
For an average duration of four quarters (in the hybrid case  =  is also
assumed), Figure 1 shows the distributions of time t of the rst informed
price-adjustment after a shock occurring at the beginning of period 0.
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Figure 1: Distribution of time at which the rst informed
price-adjustment occurs (average duration: 1 year)
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Two curves are shown in this gure. The pure sticky-price model and
the pure sticky-information model yield the same strictly decreasing curve.
The hybrid model with  = 0:4 =  yields a maximum one quarter after the
shock.19
The distribution for the hybrid curve is hump-shaped (at least for these
19Notice that even for the hybrid model, the curve may not be hump-shaped (in a
discrete-time representation) if this hybrid is su¢ ciently close to a pure case.
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parameter values), and is thus qualitatively di¤erent from the two pure mod-
els, which have the same decreasing curve. The intuition is the following.
In both pure models the set of rms that have not yet had an informed
price-adjustment decreases over time. Since the rms that set their rst in-
formed price-adjustment at a given date is a xed fraction of this set, their
number also decreases. In the hybrid model, the rms that set their rst
informed price-adjustment at a given date were either informed of the shock
beforehand, or not even informed. The set of uninformed rms decreases
over time. But the set of informed rms that have not yet had the opportu-
nity to change their prices increases, in the hybrid model, at the beginning
(at the very beginning it is empty since no rm is informed) and decreases
only after having reached a maximum (in the long term, it decreases toward
emptiness since the proportion of rms that have not yet had an informed
price-adjustment converges toward zero).
3 The economic environment
The last section has only discussed the probability of some events assuming
a constant probability  of receiving an opportunity to change prices and an
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independent probability  of updating information. To study the dynamics
of ination, however, it is necessary to know not only when rms change their
prices, but also by how much. The price a rm wants to set depends on the
economic environment in which the price-setting and information-updating
process is imbedded. I follow the simple framework of MR, in which rms set
their prices equal to a weighted average of current and future desired prices.
As in MR, I assume:
pt = pt + yt , (3.1)
yt = mt   pt . (3.2)
Equation (3.1) says that a rms desired price pt depends on the overall
price level pt and the output gap yt (where all variables are expressed in logs
and potential output is normalized to zero). In periods of booms, marginal
costs rise and each rm would like to raise its relative price. This equation
could be derived from the rms prot-maximization problem (although the
real marginal cost of the rm would appear rather than the output gap) and
 could be expressed in terms of deep parameters. Combining equations
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(3.2) and (3.1) yields pt = (1  ) pt+mt. Therefore  = 1 corresponds to
the strategic-neutrality case.
Equation (3.2) expresses aggregate demand as a function of pt and an
exogenous variable mt, which can be interpreted as the log of money supply
or, more broadly, as incorporating the many other variables that shift aggre-
gate demand.20 More generally, aggregate demand would also depend on the
nominal interest rate. Here, however, I follow the simple approach of MR
and exclude this possibility.
Let xt;k be the price actually set at time t by a rm receiving the oppor-
tunity to set its price at time t and holding information updated for the last
time at time t   k. This rm sets xt;k equal to an average of its expected
desired prices for time t and later, weighted by the probability that the price
set at time t will not have changed:
xt;k = 
1X
j=0
h
(1  )j Et k
 
pt+j
i
; (3.3)
where Et k is the expectation of rms with information last updated at time
t  k (or equivalently the expectation of the best-informed rms at t  k).
20This equation is used to derive the impulse response function, but not the Phillips
curve.
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In the sticky-price case, a rm is always informed, thus k = 0 and equation
(3.3) becomes xt;k=0 = 
1X
j=0
h
(1  )j Et
 
pt+j
i
. In the sticky-information
case,  = 1, and equation (3.3) is rewritten as xt;k = Et k (pt ).
21
The aggregate price level is the average of prices set by the various cohorts
of rms, weighted by the proportion of rms in each cohort:
pt =
1X
j=0
1X
k=0

j;kxt j;k where 
j;k =  (1  )j (1  )k . (3.4)
In the sticky-price case ( = 1) equation (3.4) becomes pt = 
1X
j=0
(1  )j xt j;k=0.
In the sticky-information case ( = 1) equation (3.4) becomes pt =

1X
k=0
(1  )k xt;k.
4 The Phillips curve
The Phillips curve yields a relationship between prices and the output gap.
This is an intermediate stage before computing the ination impulse re-
21(1  )j is, in fact, undetermined when  = 1 and j = 0. Actually, this is calculated
assuming  innitesimally close to 1 but not equal to 1. The resulting formula is indeed
the same as the one used by Mankiw and Reis (2002) for the sticky-information case. A
similar comment applies in other places in this paper.
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sponse, since plugging equation (3.2) into the Phillips curve yields a rela-
tionship between prices and money supply. This section presents the Phillips
curve without yet assuming strategic neutrality.
Appendix I shows that, after some tedious algebra, equations (3.1), (3.3)
and (3.4) yield the following Phillips curve:
t   Et (t+1) = 
2
1   [yt + "t (p

t )] ; (4.1)
where "t is an operator that takes the sum of expectation errors made at
t (i.e. the average of expectation errors made by various cohorts weighted
by the number of rms in each cohort). In the hybrid model, the sum of
expectation errors made at t on pt , is equal to:
"t (p

t ) = 
1X
k=1
(1  )k [Et k (pt )  pt ] : (4.2)
The term Et (t+1) in equation (4.1) is dened as follows:
Et (t+1) = 
"

1X
k=0
(1  )k xt+1;k+1   pt
#
. (4.3)
The expectation operator Et obviously di¤ers from the expectation Et
established on the basis of the best information available at t (or equiva-
lently, made by the best-informed agents at t), since there is no reason why
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only the expectations of the best-informed rms should matter while the
ination expectations of rms setting their price at time based on old infor-
mation would be completely neglected. What is perhaps more surprising is
that the relevant expectation operator is not simply an average of the var-
ious ination expectations.22 Equation (4.3) gives the ination expected to
prevail at time t+1 when the aggregate price level at t+1 is expected to be

1X
k=0
(1  )k xt+1;k+1 while the aggregate price level at time t is known to be
pt. One interpretation is the following: make a survey asking all rms23 by
how much they expect to increase their own prices from t to t+1 (dont ask
them about their expectations for the increase of the aggregate price level);
then Et (t+1) is the sum of these expected price increases. The proof is the
following. Each rm will answer that it faces a probability 1   of keeping
its price constant, and a probability  of being able to reset its price. Thus,
its expected increase of its own price is  times the di¤erence between the
price it expects to set if it is able to reset it and its current price (all rms
22The average ination expectation is 
"

1X
k=0
(1  )k Et k (pt+1)  pt
#
. See section 5
for a specic example in which the operator Et (t+1) is shown to be di¤erent from the
average ination expectations.
23Ask all rms once they know if they can reset their price at time t or not (rms that
cannot reset their prices at time t are also to be included in the survey).
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are aware of their current prices). Summing all these answers yields equa-
tion (4.3):  times the di¤erence between the sum 
1X
k=0
(1  )k xt+1;k+1 of
all answers about the prices rms would expect to set at t + 1 (if they can)
and the sum pt of their current prices.
It is easy to verify that if  = 1, equation (4.1) boils down to the sticky-
price Phillips curve t   Et (t+1) = 21 yt (given, for example, in MR). In
fact, when  = 1, then "t (pt ) = 0 (i.e. there are no expectational errors
at t on pt since all rms are informed) and Et (t+1) = Et (t+1) (since all
rms have the same information set). In the other pure case, if  = 1, then
Et (t+1) disappears (rms do not need to take account of future ination
when setting their current prices, since they can change their prices in every
period), and the Phillips curve is given by yt + "t (pt ) = 0, which can be
shown to be equivalent to the Phillips curve computed by MR for the sticky-
information model.
The hybrid Phillips curve could be compared with the Phillips curves of
other models. Three models would be particularly interesting in this respect.
Woodford (2003) assumes that information-updating does not occur with a
constant probability but is simply delayed by a xed number of periods (thus
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extending a model he wrote with Rotemberg, in which the delay is always
one period). Altig et al. (2005) assume that between two re-optimizations
rms follow simple (non-optimal) indexation rules. Gali and Gertler (1999)
assume that a fraction of rms set prices according to a rule of thumb (they
index their prices according to last-period ination) while the other rms
have rational expectations.
Some di¤erences between their Phillips curves and mine are due to a
di¤erence in frameworks. But even after adapting their models to MRs
framework (this involves setting the preference for the present to zero and
assuming that the real marginal cost is proportional to output) important
di¤erences remain. In the Rotemberg-Woodford model, when a rm sets its
price for a given date, it always perfectly anticipates the aggregate price-level
that will prevail at that date because all other rms will be setting their prices
for that date on the basis of the same common information set. This is not
the case in my hybrid model. An important di¤erence between my hybrid
model, on one hand, and the Gali-Gertler model or the model of Altig et al.
(2005), on the other hand, is that their Phillips curves do not involve past
expectations whereas my hybrid model does (it inherits this feature from the
sticky-information model).
35
5 The ination impulse response in the strategic-
neutrality case
Strategic neutrality in price setting means that a rms desired price does
not depend on the prices set by competitors. After examining the relevance
of this assumption, I discuss the ination impulse response to three types
of unanticipated shocks: i) a transitory shock to the money-supply growth
rate or, equivalently, a permanent shock to the money-supply level (which
is experiment 1 in MR), ii) a permanent shock to the money-supply growth
rate (experiment 2 in MR), and iii) the intermediate case of a persistent but
not permanent shock to the money-supply growth rate.
5.1 Strategic neutrality
How can the desired price of a rm be independent of the prices set by
competitors? A rst answer would be that in the standard monopolistic-
competition model à la Dixit-Stiglitz, rms set their prices at a constant
markup over the marginal cost. Thus the prices of competitors do not directly
inuence the desired price. This answer, however, does not take into account
the possibility that the prices of competitors may indirectly inuence the
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desired price, through their impact on marginal costs.
During the staggered price-setting process, a rm that adjusts its prices
is motivated by several incentives. First, it might want to adjust less than
what it would if all other rms had the opportunity to adjust, because it
faces competition from those rms that have not adjusted yet. This strate-
gic complementarity in price setting may hold even if rms simply choose a
markup that is a constant proportion of the marginal cost without taking
prices set by competitors directly into account. For example, assume there
is a reduction in money supply. Then a rm that adjusts its prices down-
ward, while some other rms have not yet done so, will face greater demand
than otherwise. If marginal productivity decreases with output (or if there
are some rm-specic factors), then marginal costs increase with output (as-
suming that the prices of production factors bought on the economy-wide
market stay constant), and, even if the rm faced no nominal rigidities, it
would want to set its price higher than it would if other rms didnt face
nominal rigidities in order not to be overburdened by a overly high demand.
However, the price of production factors bought on the economy-wide
market need not stay constant. This can lead the rm to decrease its prices
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by more than needed to reach the frictionless equilibrium (strategic substi-
tutability in price setting). Assuming that the real wage is pro-cyclical, it
will be lower during the transitory recession generated by the reduction in
money supply. This tends to decrease marginal cost and thus lead to lower
prices. If the complementarity and the substitutability incentives cancel each
other out, there is strategic neutrality in price setting: a rm would choose
to set its prices independently of the aggregate price level.
Whether there is complementarity or substitutability in price-setting is
a much debated issue in the literature. Using a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model with sticky prices, Chari et al. (2000) nd that
strategic substitutability arises from realistic deep-parameter values of their
model. On the other hand, Woodford (2003) argues that Chari and al. would
nd strategic complementarity in rms price decisions if they had taken
into account the existence of rm-specic production factors. Incorporating
sticky information into di¤erent DSGE models, Keen (2005) nds strategic
substitutability, whereas Trabandt (2006) nds strategic complementarity.
My reading of the current state of this debate is that it is not settled yet, and
that the middle ground of assuming strategic neutrality would be compatible
with the literature.
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5.2 Permanent shocks to the money-supply level
Lets consider the case of a shock  to the level of money supply. Appendix
II shows that in this case, for t  0, the aggregate price level pt in the hybrid
model is given by:
pt = mt + 


    (1  )
t+2   
    (1  )
t+2

for  6=  (6.1)
pt = mt    (1  )t+1 [1 + (t+ 1)] for  =  .
Whereas, in the sticky-price and the sticky-information models, pt is re-
spectively given by:
pt;=1 = mt    (1  )t+1 for  = 1
pt;=1 = mt    (1  )t+1 for  = 1.
Thus the pure sticky-price and the pure sticky-information cases yield the
same price dynamics if they are calibrated to get the same average duration
between two re-optimizations, that is, if the parameter  used in the sticky-
price case is the same as the parameter  used in the sticky-information
case.
If  6= , the price level in the hybrid case pt can be expressed as a linear
combination of the two pure casesprice levels:
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pt =
(1 )pt;=1 (1 )pt;=1
  where the weights
(1 )
  and  (1 )  have
opposite signs (thus, it is a linear combination, but not a weighted average
although the sum is 1). Or equivalently: pt = pt;=1 + 
1 
  (pt;=1   pt;=1).
Equation (6.1) implies that the ination response for t  0 is given by:
t   g =
8>><>>:
 t for t  0
0 for t < 0
, (6.2)
where g is the money-supply growth rate for t 6= 0.
The ination response after the shock is proportional to the probability
t given in equation (2.2) that a rm sets its rst informed price-adjustment
at t. Thus Figure 1 already shows the impulse response of ination for
di¤erent congurations of the parameters representing the degree of price
and information stickiness. This gure is reproduced below (a curve giving
the impulse response for  = 0:25 =  is added). As discussed in section
2, setting  and  equal to 0:4 yields the same average duration before the
rst informed adjustment as in the sticky-price model ( = 0:25 &  = 1)
or the sticky-information model ( = 1 &  = 0:25). On the other hand,
the hybrid model calibrated at  = 0:25 =  generates a greater degree of
nominal rigidity.
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Figure 2: Ination impulse response to a permanent shock to the
money-supply level
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With these parameter values, the sticky-information model yields the
same ination response as the sticky-price model. Moreover, after the initial
jump, it decreases monotonically, whereas the impulse response in the hybrid
model is hump-shaped. When for the hybrid model the probability of being
informed is the same as the probability of having the opportunity to reset
prices, and probabilities are calibrated as in MR to yield an average duration
of one year before an informed price-adjustment takes place, then the maxi-
mum occurs one quarter after the shock. If the overall nominal rigidities are
larger ( = 0:25 = ), then the maximum response of ination occurs later.
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The intuition as to why ination is proportional to the probability of
setting a rst informed price-adjustment is easiest to understand if the level
of money supply is constant before the shock, is modied by the shock, and
remains at its new level after the shock. In this scenario, the price set after
the shock by an informed rm is at its long-term equilibrium. In this case
rms change their prices only once: they adjust to the long-term equilibrium
as soon as they can set their rst informed price-adjustments. Since all rms
had the same price before the shock and end up with the same new long-
term equilibrium, the ination response is proportional to the number of rst
informed price-adjustments.
The impulse response of ination computed for the special case of a zero
money-supply growth rate remains the same for any other constant growth
rate. To see this, consider equation (II.2):
pt = (1  ) pt 1+2
1X
k=0
(1  )k
" 1X
j=0
h
(1  )j Et k ((1  ) pt+j + mt+j)
i#
.
If the money-supply dynamics are of the form eemt = eem 1+eeg (t+ 1), then
pt = mt in the absence of shocks. Therefore, equation (II.2) can be rewritten
replacing p by ep = p  eem and m by em = m  eem. Choosing eem 1 = m 1 and
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eeg = g, it follows that eemt = mnew;t (where mnew;t extends to all time the a¢ ne
relationship between t and m that holds after the shock), and thus emt = 0
after the shock.
If we know how to solve (II.2) for the price dynamics in the case where
money supply is constant after the shock, and want to know the price dynam-
ics when money supply grows at a constant rate after the shock, all we need to
do is subtract emt = mnew;t from the p and m variables to be in the setting in
which money supply is zero after the shock, solve for the dynamics of ep, and
add back mnew;t. Adding back mnew;t will change the aggregate price level
but not the di¤erence between ination with the shock and ination without
the shock (the constant eem 1 disappears when ination is computed, and the
term eeg disappears when the di¤erence between ination with and without
the shock is computed). The point is that, and this is true in the general case
since the argument is based on equation (II.2), the ination impulse response
is invariant to a transformation of the money-supply dynamics consisting in
adding a money-supply component with a constant growth rate.
Lets compute Et (t+1) for t = 0 in the simple case where the level
of money supply is 0 before the shock, is modied to  by the shock, and
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remains at  after the shock. Firms unaware of the shock expect to keep
their prices constant even if they are allowed to reset them. Similarly, rms
aware of the shock, and having had the opportunity to make an informed
price-adjustment, have fully adjusted already, and thus expect to keep their
prices constant even if they could reset prices in the future (expectations
are polled at a point in the period t = 0 when each rm knows if it can
reset its price at t = 0 or not). The only rms expecting to change their
own prices are those that are informed of the shock but havent had an
opportunity for an informed price-adjustment. These rms, which at t = 0
are a proportion  (1  ) of all rms, expect to increase their own prices
by an amount  if they have an opportunity to do so. Thus, E0 (1) =
 (1  ): the probability  (1  ) of being informed without having had
an opportunity for an informed price-adjustment times the probability  of
having an opportunity to adjust prices next period times the price change
. The average ination expectations can also be computed. Firms unaware
of the shock expect zero ination. Firms aware of the shock (whether they
had an opportunity to make an informed price adjustment or not), which
at t = 0 are a proportion  of all rms, know that ination at time t = 1
will be  1. Thus, the average next period ination expected at t = 0 is
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1. From equation (2.2), 1 = 2
 
1  +
2

. Hence, the ratio at t = 0 of
average ination expectations to E0 (1) is 2
1 +
2
1  . This ratio is equal to
1 if  = 1 , i.e. in the pure sticky-price case. If  6= 1, this ratio is usually
di¤erent from 1 (the only other exception is when  = 1  ). This example
proves that the operator E can be di¤erent from the average expectations.
5.3 Permanent shocks to the money-supply growth rate
Lets continue to assume that rms are strategically neutral, but that at time
t = 0 there is a shock to the money-supply growth rate rather than to the
level of money supply. Equation (II.13) in Appendix II implies that in this
case the level of ination for t  0 is given by:
t = g + (g   gold)
26666664
 t(1 )t+1
 
+
(1 )(1 )[(1 )t (1 )t]
( )2
  (1  )t+1
37777775 for  6=  (6.3)
t = g + (g   gold) (1  )t

2
2
t (t+ 1)  (1  )

for  = .
Notice that (for t  0):
If  = 1 then t = g.
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If  = 1 then t = g +
  (1  )t+1 +  (1  )t t (g   gold).
If  =  then t = g+
  (1  )t+1 + 2 (1  )t t (t+ 1) =2 (g   gold).
Figure 3 shows the impulse response to a money-supply growth shock,
using the same numerical example as for Figure 2.
Figure 3: Ination impulse response to a permanent shock to the
money-supply growth rate
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These curves show the impulse response at time t as a proportion of the
long-run response. All curves converge toward 1 in the long run. For the
sticky-price case ( = 1) the ination response is at, whereas it is hump-
shaped for the sticky-information case (  = 1), reaching a maximum at
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t = 1 

  1
ln(1 ) . The impulse response is also hump-shaped for the hybrid
case both when  =  = 0:25 and when  =  = 0:4. The two hybrid curves
are hump-shaped, but the maximum occurs later for the rst curve. There
is a jump in ination at time t = 0 for all four curves, but this jump is much
larger for the sticky-price curve than for the other curves. Overall, the two
hybrid curves have the same qualitative features as the sticky-information
curve, both contrasting sharply with the sticky-price curve. In contrast with
the case of a shock to the money-supply level, the sticky-information curve is
similar to the hybrid case here. The advantage of the hybrid curve relates to
micro evidence rather than macro evidence: in the sticky-information model
every rm changes its price every period (in contrast with micro evidence),
whereas this is not the case in the hybrid model.
5.4 Persistent but not permanent shocks to the money-
supply growth rate
Lets consider another type of monetary shock. Suppose that
mold;t = m 1 + (t+ 1) gold for t < 0 ,
mt = m 1 + (t+ 1) gold + "0
tX
i=0
i for t  0 ,
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where  is the autocorrelation of the money-supply growth rate. If  = 0,
then the shock is completely transitory, corresponding to the permanent
shock to the level of money supply discussed in section 5.2. If  = 1, then
the shock is permanent, corresponding to the permanent shock to the money-
supply growth rate discussed in section 5.3. Intermediate values of  corre-
spond to a persistent but not permanent shock to the money-supply growth
rate: the money-supply growth rate changes the most at t = 0, then changes
each period by a smaller amount and converges toward its initial value gold.
During this process, a change of the money-supply level of "0
1  takes place
gradually. In considering this experiment, MR regard the value of  = 0:5
as being realistic for U.S. quarterly data.
In the strategic-neutrality case, it is possible to nd a closed-form solution
for the aggregate price dynamics (see equation II.14 in appendix II). Figure
4 shows the impulse response of ination using the same numerical example
as for Figures 2 and 3.
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Figure 4: Ination impulse response to a shock to the
money-supply growth rate with autocorelation  = 0:5
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This gure shows that the ination impulse response is not hump-shaped
in the sticky-price model whereas it is hump-shaped in the sticky-information
model and in the hybrid model. The ination impulse responses of the sticky-
information and the hybrid models are still qualitatively similar. Section 5.2
has shown that decreasing the persistence of the shock ultimately favors the
hybrid model. For the intermediate case of  = 0:5, a small advantage for the
hybrid model can already be observed in the sense that the ination jump
at the shock is smaller and the hump appears later in the hybrid model (the
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exact date at which the hump appears depends on the calibration).
6 Conclusion
Most macroeconomic models cannot explain the two following stylized facts
simultaneously: i) individual rms change prices every six months to a year
and ii) ination impulse responses to monetary shocks are hump-shaped.
This paper presents a hybrid sticky-price and sticky-information model com-
patible with both of these facts.
In the case of a permanent shock to the growth rate of money supply, the
ination responses are hump-shaped both in the hybrid and in the sticky-
information models, and both are clearly di¤erent from the monotonic re-
sponse of the sticky-price model. Reducing the persistence of the shock
ultimately favors the hybrid model. If the shock is completely transitory, the
hybrid model delivers a hump-shaped ination response to monetary policy,
whereas the two pure cases yield the same strictly decreasing response. In-
tuitively, this result relates to the hump-shaped dynamics of the number of
informed rms that have not yet had the opportunity to re-optimize their
prices since the shock occurred. In the intermediate case of a shock to the
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money-supply growth rate with an autocorrelation coe¢ cient equal to 0.5,
the hybrid and the sticky-information models yield qualitatively similar in-
ation impulse responses.
On the way to computing ination impulse responses, I derive the Phillips
curve for the hybrid model (without, at this stage, assuming anything about
strategic neutrality). One novel feature of this Phillips curve is that it in-
volves a new kind of expectation operator.
This study could be extended by considering other kinds of monetary
shocks or deviation from strategic neutrality. It is not clear that in these
settings the hybrid model will be so distinctly superior to the pure models as
it is in the examples discussed here. A priori, it could be expected that the
hybrid model behaves more as an average of the pure models would in the
case of anticipated shocks. Whether this is the case or not could be checked.
The results of this paper have been obtained under the assumption of
strategic neutrality in the pricing decisions of rms. It would be impor-
tant to discuss the case of strategic complementarity since this may increase
persistence. Would strategic complementarity penalize the hybrid model rel-
ative to the sticky-information model? Strategic complementarity is likely to
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make the sticky-information ination impulse-response more hump-shaped.
It would be interesting to know how the ination impulse response changes
according to the degree of strategic complementarity in the hybrid model.
Another issue is that strategic complementarity may allow the hybrid model
to remedy a shortcoming of the sticky-information model that has not yet
been discussed in this paper: in the sticky-information model, a monetary
shock would have no impact on ination once all rms are informed of the
shock.24 This would be obvious if information updating were assumed to oc-
cur at intervals of constant duration (then all rms would be informed after
that duration) rather than with a constant probability (in which case there
are always some rms that are not informed yet). But a hybrid of the stan-
dard sticky-price model and a sticky-information model in which information
is updated at constant intervals would become a sticky-price model as soon
as all rms are informed. Thus, the hybrid model may inherit the endoge-
nous persistence that, assuming strategic complementarity, the sticky-price
model features in most cases.25
24Collard and Dellas (2003) and Dupor and Tsuruga (2005) criticize the sticky-
information model on this account.
25This phenomenon is best thought of as a "contract multiplier," as Taylor (1980) put
it. In the special case where perfect adjustment is immediate (this happens in the case
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Other interesting further research would include: i) discussing the case
in which the price-adjustment opportunity and information updating are not
independent or are state-dependent, and ii) extending the model to a general-
equilibrium setting.
of a permanent shock to the money-supply growth rate), the contract multiplier cannot
generate additional persistence.
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Appendix I: Derivation of the hybrid Phillips
curve
Two intermediate equations
Lets rst derive two equations that will be useful later.
Equation (3.3) yields:
xt;k = Et k (pt ) + (1  )xt+1;k+1 (I.1)
because xt;k = 
1X
j=0
h
(1  )j Et k
 
pt+j
i
= Et k (pt )+
1X
j=1
h
(1  )j Et k
 
pt+j
i
= Et k (pt ) + (1  )
1X
j=0
h
(1  )j Et k
 
pt+1+j
i
= Et k (pt ) + (1  )xt+1;k+1.
Equation (3.4) yields:
pt = 
1X
k=0
h
(1  )k xt;k
i
+ (1  ) pt 1 (I.2)
because
pt = 
1X
j=0
"
(1  )j
1X
k=0
(1  )k xt j;k
#
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= 
" 1X
k=0
(1  )k xt;k
#
+ 
1X
j=1
"
(1  )j
1X
k=0
(1  )k xt j;k
#
,
where

1X
j=1
"
(1  )j
1X
k=0
(1  )k xt j;k
#
= (1  )
1X
j=0
"
(1  )j
1X
k=0
(1  )k xt 1 j;k
#
= (1  ) pt 1
Rewriting the hybrid Phillips curve
The hybrid Phillips curve t   Et (t+1) = 21  [yt + "t (pt )],
where Et (t+1) = 
"

1X
k=0
(1  )k xt+1;k+1   pt
#
and "t (pt ) = 
1X
k=1
(1  )k [Et k (pt )  pt ],
can be rewritten as:
t 
"

1X
k=0
(1  )k xt+1;k+1   pt
#
= 
2
1 
"
yt + 
1X
k=1
(1  )k [Et k (pt )  pt ]
#
,
which, using pt = pt+yt and t = pt pt 1, becomes after some algebraic
transformations:
pt   (1  ) pt 1   (1  ) 
1X
k=0
h
(1  )k xt+1;k+1
i
2
= 
1X
k=0
(1  )k Et k (pt + yt) .
(I.3)
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Deriving the hybrid Phillips Curve
Equation (I.3) is true since
pt (1 )pt 1 (1 )
1X
k=0
[(1 )kxt+1;k+1]
2
=

1X
k=0
[(1 )kxt;k] (1 )
1X
k=0
[(1 )kxt+1;k+1]
2
using equation (I.2)
=

1X
k=0
[(1 )k[Et k(pt )+(1 )xt+1;k+1]] (1 )
1X
k=0
[(1 )kxt+1;k+1]
2
using equa-
tion (I.1)
= 
1X
k=0
h
(1  )k Et k (pt )
i
algebra
= 
1X
k=0
(1  )k Et k (pt + yt) using equation (3.1)
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Appendix II: The ination impulse response
This appendix gives some equations for computing the impulse responses
and explains why computation of the impulse response is easier in the pure
cases (sticky prices or sticky information) and in the strategic neutrality case
than in the general case.
II.1) The general case
Plugging equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (4.2) and (4.3) into the hybrid
Phillips curve (4.1) yields:
(1  )
1X
k=0
(1  )k xt+1;k+1 (II.1)
  1  2 (1  ) pt + (1  ) pt 1
=  2
(
mt +
1X
k=1
(1  )k [Et k ((1  ) pt + mt)]
)
.
Plugging into equation (II.1) xt+1;k+1 expressed in terms of p and m ac-
cording to equation (3.3) yields:26
pt = (1  ) pt 1+2
1X
k=0
(1  )k
" 1X
j=0
h
(1  )j Et k ((1  ) pt+j + mt+j)
i#
.
(II.2)
26Alternatively, plug equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) into equation (I.2) of appendix I.
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In the general case this equation involves an innity of aggregate prices
(all aggregate prices from t   1 and thereafter). Some algebraic transfor-
mations can, however, reduce this dimensionality to a third-order recursive
equation with variable coe¢ cients. This equation is solvable (not necessarily
analytically, but at least numerically). The resolution of the general case is
left for further research. I will focus below on three special cases in which
computation is simple.
II.2) Three simple cases
Sticky information
In the sticky-information case,  = 1, and the future aggregate prices on
the right-hand side of equation (II.2) disappear (and so does the last-period
aggregate price), which yields a simple equation in pt:
pt = 
1X
k=0
(1  )k [Et k ((1  ) pt + mt)] . (II.3)
This equation can be solved (assuming rational expectations) once the
nature of the monetary shock is specied.
In the absence of shocks, Et k (pt) = pt and Et k (mt) = mt, and equation
(II.3) yields pt = mt (whatever the dynamics of m).
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If there is only a lone shock occurring at time t = 0, and if it is not
anticipated, then (II.3) becomes:
pt  mt
mold;t  mt =
(1  )t+1
+ (1  )t+1 (1  ) , (II.4)
wheremold;t is the actual money-supply before the shock, or the money supply
that would have prevailed after time t = 0 if no shock had occurred. mt still
denotes the actual money-supply (mt = mold;t for t < 0, but is di¤erent
from mold;t at t = 0, and may be di¤erent later on as well). Equation (II.4)
gives a measure of the incompleteness of the price adjustment made at time
t (as a proportion of the adjustment that would have been made at time
t in the absence of nominal rigidities). For t < 0, equation (II.4) yields
pt = mt. Ination can be computed by extracting pt from equation (II.4)
and substracting a lagged version of this equation.
Sticky prices
In the pure sticky-price model, equation (II.2) becomes (after plugging in
 = 1):
pt = (1  ) pt 1 + 2
1X
j=0
h
(1  )j Et ((1  ) pt+j + mt+j)
i
. (II.5)
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The future aggregate price levels are still present, but they can be elimi-
nated easily by writing equation (II.5) for t+ 1, taking the expectation at t,
and substracting equation (II.5) for t divided by 1  . This yields:
Etpt+1  

2 +
2
1  

pt + pt 1 =   
2
1  mt. (II.6)
This is a second-order recursive equation with constant coe¢ cients. There
are several ways to solve this equation analytically. For example, the dimen-
sionality can be further reduced to
pt = pt 1 + (1  )2
1X
i=0
iEtmt+i, (II.7)
where  is solution of 2+ 
2
1  = +
1

such that  < 1. The solution of (II.7)
is:
pt = (1  )2
1X
k=0
1X
i=0
i+kEt kmt k+i. (II.8)
Assuming that there is only a lone unanticipated shock occurring at time
t = 0, equation (II.8) could be expressed in terms of mold;t and mt. In the
sticky-price model it particularly makes sense to focus on cases in which
the growth rate of the money supply (without taking the logs) is constant
everywhere except when a shock occurs, because only in such cases would the
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output gap be zero in the absence of shocks (or if the shock lies innitely far
in the past): in the absence of shocks, Et (pt+1) = pt+1 and equation (II.6)
becomes t+1 = 
2
1  (pt  mt), which yields pt = mt only if mt is an a¢ ne
function of time. Lets thus consider that money-supply dynamics is given
by mt = mold;t = m 1 + (t+ 1) gold until a shock occurs at t = 0 such that
mt = m 1 +  + (t+ 1) g for t  0. Then, the solution is:
pt = mt   t+1 for t  0 (II.9)
pt = mold;t for t < 0.
Thus, adjustment is perfect and immediate if  = 0 (even if there is a
change in the growth rate).
Strategic neutrality
In the case of strategic neutrality ( = 1), equation (II.2) becomes:
pt = (1  ) pt 1 + 2
1X
k=0
(1  )k
" 1X
j=0
h
(1  )j Et k (mt+j)
i#
. (II.10)
All future aggregate prices have disappeared (as in the sticky-information
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model), but the last-period aggregate price is still present: this is a rst-order
recursive equation with constant coe¢ cients that can be solved easily:
pt = 
2
1X
k=0
(1  )k
" 1X
l=0
1X
j=0
h
(1  )j+lEt l k (mt l+j)
i#
. (II.11)
Lets assume that there is only one shock, that it is not anticipated and
that it occurs at t = 0. As above, mold;t is the actual money-supply before
the shock or the money supply that would have prevailed after time t = 0 if
no shock had occurred. Then Et l k (mt l+j) = mold;t l+j except if t  k  l
and t+ j  l (that is, except if t+ j  l) in which case it is equal to mt l+j.
Then equation (II.11) becomes for t  0:
pt = 
2
8>>>><>>>>:
tX
k=0
(1  )k
" 1X
j=0
t kX
l=0
h
(1  )j+l (mt l+j  mold;t l+j)
i#
+
1X
k=0
(1  )k
" 1X
j=0
1X
l=0
h
(1  )j+lmold;t l+j
i#
9>>>>=>>>>; .
(II.12)
Under which conditions is the output gap zero in the absence of a shock?
As shown above, this is the case for the sticky-price model only if mone-
tary supply is an a¢ ne function of time. Since the strategic-neutrality case
overlaps with the sticky-price case, being an a¢ ne function of time is a nec-
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essary condition for money-supply dynamics to yield a zero output gap in
the absence of a shock for every parameter value of the strategic-neutrality
case. That this necessary condition is also su¢ cient is most easily seen in
the Phillips curve (4.1) itself.
 Permanent shock to the money-supply level and growth rate
Lets focus, as in the sticky-price model, on money-supply dynamics
given by mt = mold;t = m 1 + (t+ 1) gold until an unanticipated shock
occurs at t = 0 such that mt = mnew;t = m 1 +  + (t+ 1) g for t  0.
Then, for t  0, the solution is:27
pt =
mt + 
h

  (1  )t+2     (1  )t+2
i
+(g   gold)
2664 (t+ 1) (1  )t+2  
+
(1 )(1 )[(1 )t+1 (1 )t+1]
( )2
3775 for  6= 
(II.13)
pt = mt  
8>><>>:
 (1  )t+1 [1 + (t+ 1)]
+ (g   gold) (t+ 1) (1  )t+1
 
1 + 
2
t

9>>=>>; for  = .
From this equation, ination could be computed. In particular, if the
monetary shock occurs only to the level of money supply (that is, g =
27If there is a mnew;t instead of a mt in (II.13), then this formula is also valid for t =  1
(with mnew;t= 1 = m 1 + ).
69
gold), then ination is simply given (for t  0) by t   g =  t, where
t is the probability that a rm sets its rst informed price-adjustment
t periods after the shock.
 Persistent but not permanent shocks to the money-supply
growth rate
Lets consider the following shock:
mold;t = m 1 + (t+ 1) gold for t < 0
mt = m 1 + (t+ 1) gold + "0
tX
i=0
i for t  0.
This implies that mt   gold =  (mt 1   gold) + "t , where "t = "0 if
t = 0 and zero otherwise.
Thus,  is the autocorrelation of the money-supply growth rate. If
 = 0, then the shock is completely transitory (or equivalently, it is a
permanent shock to the level of money supply). If  = 1, then this is
a permanent shock to the money-supply growth rate. Then, for t  0,
the solution is:
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a) for  6= 
pt = mt+
1
1 "0
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:

  (1  )t+2     (1  )t+2
+t+1
+ 
1  1 

1
+ 1 

1
1  (1 )
2666666666666664
 (1  )t+2
+(1  ) t+1 (1  )t+2
  (1  ) t+1
+t+2 (1  )
2664 1
  (1  )t+1
3775
3777777777777775
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
.(II.14)
b) for  = 
pt = mt+"0
1
1  1 

1
1+(1 ) 1 

8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 1 t+1
1   (1  )t+1
+ (1  )t+1

1 t+1
1    (t+ 1)


1 
+1 
2
(1  ) (1  )t+1 + (1  )t+1  (t+ 1)  t+1
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
.
Here again, the ination dynamics can be computed.
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